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Abstract
A crucial technical challenge for cybercriminals is to keep control over the potentially millions of
infected devices that build up their botnets, without compromising the robustness of their attacks. A
single, fixed C&C server, for example, can be trivially detected either by binary or traffic analysis and
immediately sink-holed or taken-down by security researchers or law enforcement. Botnets often use
Domain Generation Algorithms (DGAs), primarily to evade take-down mechanisms. DGAs enlarge
the lifespan of a malware campaign, thus enhancing its profitability. They can also contribute to
hardening attack attribution. In this work, we introduce HYDRA the most comprehensive and complete
available dataset of Algorithmically-Generated Domains (AGD). The dataset contains more than 100
DGA families, including both real-world and adversarial ones. We analyse the dataset and discuss the
possibility of differentiating between benign requests (to real domains) and malicious ones (to AGDs)
in real-time. The simultaneous study of so many families and variants introduces several challenges;
nonetheless, it alleviates biases found in previous literature that deals with small datasets and exploit
some characteristic features of particular families. To this end, we thoroughly compare our approach
with the current state-of-the-art and highlight some methodological shortcomings in the actual state
of practice. The outcomes obtained show that our method significantly outperforms the current
state-of-the-art in terms of both accuracy and efficiency.
Index terms— Malware, Domain Generation Algorithms, Botnets, DNS, Algorithmically Generated
Domain
1 Introduction
The continuous arms race between malware authors and security researchers has pushed modern mal-
ware to evolve into highly sophisticated software, that can be used to infect millions of devices. The vast
amount of sensitive information that can be extracted from infected devices, coupled with the harness-
ing of their resources and processing power, provides a wide range of monetisation methods fuelling a
flourishing worldwide underground economy.
While device infection is the key that paves the way in, the main objectives are generally persistence
and orchestration. An orchestrating entity, the botmaster, manages infected devices (bots) which in
many cases can scale to the order of millions, creating what we call a botnet [41]. The botmaster
manages a Command and Control (C&C) server that communicates with the bots. This communication
must preserve some degree of unlinkability to thwart any attempts to identify the botmaster. To ensure
unlinkability and as a counter-measure against take-down mechanisms, botnets frequently make use of
domain fluxing [37, 59] through Domain Generation Algorithms (DGAs). DGAs produce a vast amount
of domain names, which bots try to communicate with iteratively to find the actual C&C server. However,
only a small part of them is registered, creating a hydra effect [32]. The botmaster may regularly pivot
control between domains, and hamper the task of seizing control of the botnet. This is helped by the fact
that an outsider cannot determine which domains will be used, nor statically block all these requests.
The latter stems from the fact that there are too many domains, and the seed yielding a sequence of
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Figure 1: The modus operandi of a typical DGA-powered botnet. Source: [36].
domains might change frequently. Figure 1 illustrates the modus operandi of a typical DGA-powered
botnet.
Currently, there are several families of DGAs employed by various malware with varying rates of
requests and different characteristics. This heterogeneous landscape deters the timely and accurate
detection of an Algorithmically-Generated Domain (AGD) [50] request, which could serve as an accurate
indicator of compromise (IoC) of a host at the network level. Recent research tries to categorise DNS
requests per DGA, often exploiting WHOIS-based features. We agree that from the perspective of an ISP,
CSIRT, or CERT, such an approach might be beneficial. However, we argue that from the perspective
of the endpoint security, such an approach cannot be considered adequate. First, the network operator
does not generally know which DGA is utilised by the malware that infected a given host in her network.
Second, utilisation of the WHOIS database introduces a significant time delay, that in many situations
cannot be tolerated by the hosts.
1.1 Contributions
Motivated by the continuous evolution of DGAs, we introduce a real-world collection called HYDRAS,
which consists of more than 95 million domains belonging to 105 unique DGA families. To the best of
our knowledge, this is the largest and most representative DGA dataset to date.
During the analysis of our dataset, we discuss the possibility of differentiating between benign requests
and malicious ones, as well as classifying the malware families that use them, in real-time. Next, we
present a comprehensive feature extraction approach, which includes lexical and statistical computations
over the collected DGAs, as well as English gibberish detectors. Using the proposed feature set, we
perform a thorough evaluation of our dataset, and the results show that our method outperforms the
current state-of-the-art in terms of both accuracy and efficiency.
More importantly, we highlight inherent biases in other methods that can be attributed to the selection
of limited datasets and/or features, which prevent their application in real-world scenarios. For example,
employing a dataset composed of only a few families that exhibit very characteristic patterns might
easily yield almost optimal detection rates, but will lead to ad-hoc solutions that are too specific and
cannot be generalised. This is, unfortunately, a common practice in the existing literature and praxis.
Any researcher can easily fall into it, unknowingly, by simply considering in his dataset families like
bamital, CCleaner, or chir, which all produce hexadecimal values of specific length as second-level
domains (SLDs). It is obvious that one can easily differentiate benign domains from such DGAs with
almost 100% accuracy by merely checking whether the SLD is a hex value of specific length. Nonetheless,
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not all DGAs families are that+ easy to detect.
Due to the particularities of this research field and the methodologies used by the current state-of-
the-art, we also highlight some recommendations for fairer future evaluations. These are particularly
relevant for comparing the results of our experiments with other approaches.
1.2 Organization
The rest of this work is organised as follows. In Section 2, we briefly describe DGA-related preliminaries,
and we provide a thorough review of the related work. In Section 3, we describe our dataset in detail.
Afterwards, we describe our approach, providing an extensive account of our methodology, including
feature extraction, as well as the tools and algorithms employed. We discuss our results in Section 5,
while we compare them to the current state-of-the-art. In Section 6, we provide an analysis of the
outcomes as well as a methodological analysis and comparison with the literature. Finally, we conclude
the paper in Section 7 and discuss open issues for future research.
2 Background
DGAs are one of the main pillars of the success of botnets. They were first devised more than ten years
ago, and they have been steadily refined over the years by successive generations of malware developers.
These algorithms generate a set of AGDs to communicate with C&C servers, thus eliminating the risks
associated with using static IP addresses [7, 33]. In [35], the authors generalise the notion of DGAs by
extending them to other protocols beyond DNS, and they propose the term Resource Identifier Generation
Algorithms (RIGAs). The authors show how decentralised permanent storage (DPS) has some potential
drawbacks and exploitable characteristics for armouring a botnet, a fact that has already been exploited
in the real world [6] due to the immutability property of DPS. Figure 2 depicts the hierarchy of RIGAs.
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Figure 2: RIGA generation flow, including diverse context protocols, such as DPS and DNS.
In its most basic form, DGAs create a set of domain names by using a deterministic pseudo-random
generator (PRNG) [43, 37]. Therefore, (infected) devices belonging to a botnet query a set of domains
generated by the DGA until they are correctly resolved to a valid IP, corresponding to the C&C server.
Since the location of the C&C server dynamically changes, blacklisting domains is a very inefficient
protection technique. Additionally, this makes seizing the botnet much more difficult, since we would
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need to take (register) all domain names generated by the DGA (with a given seed) for disrupting the
botmaster only for a short amount of time. This process will generally be very costly. Hence, the
botmaster benefits from the high ratio between the number of generated domains and registered ones,
which makes her operation cheap as compared to the cost defending against it, which involves registering
all possible domains.
According to the literature, there are two main DGA families: (i) Random-based DGA methods,
which use a PRNG to generate a set of characters that form a domain name, and (ii) Dictionary/Wordlist-
based DGA methods, which use a dictionary to produce domains. Nevertheless, we may also consider
other types of DGA families, which use more subtle approaches, i.e. valid domains that were previously
hacked to hide their C&C servers (i.e. domain shadowing) [28] as well as DGAs that generate domains
that are very similar to existing valid domains [9], further hindering the detection task. Considering the
dependency of the pre-shared secret (or seed) on time, Plohmann et al. [38] further categorise DGAs into:
(i) time-independent and deterministic, (ii) time-dependent and deterministic, and (iii) time-dependent
and non-deterministic.
A random forest classifier (RNDF) based on a set of features such as word correlations, frequency, and
part-of-speech tags is proposed in [52]. Berman [11] proposed a methodology based on Capsule Networks
(CapsNet) to detect AGDs; the author compared his method with well-known approaches such as RNNs
and CNNs, and the outcomes showed similar accuracy yet better performance. Xu et al. [49] proposed
the combination of n-gram and a deep CNNs to create an n-gram combined with character-based domain
classification (n-CBDC) model. Their model runs in an end-to-end fashion and does not require domain
feature extraction. Vinayakumar et al. [47] implemented a set of deep learning architectures with Keras
embedding and classical machine learning algorithms to classify DGA families. Their best-reported
configuration is obtained when using RNNs and SVM with a radial basis function (SVM-RBF). Yang
et al. [51] propose a heterogeneous deep neural network framework, which extracts the local features
of a domain name as well as a self-attention based Bi-LSTM to extract further global features. Their
outcomes showed higher accuracy than traditional DGA classifiers.
Adversarial and Anti-Forensic Techniques to DGAs. Recently, an exciting trend of deploying
anti-forensic techniques in DGA has become popular, aiming to create hard-to-detect DGA families and
to test the performance of classifiers. Anderson et al. [5] proposed a generative adversarial network
(GAN), which can learn and bypass classical detectors. Afterwards, they improved the performance of
used AGD detectors with the training data generated by the GAN. Alaeiyan et al. [2] proposed a DGA
family created with a genetic algorithm considering lexical features such as pronounceability. Their
experiments showed that such a DGA family was hard to detect by classical approaches. In a similar
vein, Yun et al. [55] used n-gram distribution and the pronounceability/readability of domains as a
basis to create a novel DGA based on neural language models and the Wasserstein GAN (WGAN),
which caused low detection rates for traditional DGA detection techniques. Spooren et al. [44] showed
that their deep learning RNN performs significantly better than classical machine learning approaches.
Besides, the authors stressed that one of the issues of manual feature engineering is that an adversary
may adapt her strategy if she knows which features are used in the detection. Fu et al. [20] proposed
two DGAs that use hidden Markov models (HMMs) and probabilistic context-free grammars, which
were tested on state-of-the-art detection systems. Their results revealed that these DGAs hindered the
detection rate of used approaches. Patsakis and Casino [34] proposed a probabilistic method to detect
wordlist-based DGAs, which exploited the fact that some DGAs use a relatively limited dictionary, often
resulting in word repetitions and the “birthday problem”. Their method is capable of detecting both
real-world and custom DGAs created to fool traditional detectors.
Finally, due to the widespread use of covert/encrypted communication channels for DNS (e.g. DNSCurve,
DNS over HTTPS and DNS over TLS) or C&C connections in general [58, 21], malware creators have
an additional layer to hide their activity, rendering traditional DGA detection useless. Nevertheless, as
shown by Patsakis et al. [36], NXDomain detection can still be performed in such a scenario as well as
feature extraction, so that DGA families can still be classified with high performance.
3 The HYDRAS Dataset
n this section, we introduce the HYDRAS dataset, which consists of a collection of benign and AGD
domains, both real-world as well as adversarial. The name of the dataset originates from the insightful
parallelism of Nadji et al. [32] of DGA-powered botnets with the mythical ancient Greek monster Hydra.
Benign domains are sampled from the Alexa 1M dataset. Since the Alexa dataset contains sites and
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not domains, we had to preprocess it as follows. First, we removed all top-level domain names (e.g. .com,
.org) from each entry and kept only the SLD. Then, we pruned the duplicates since some web pages have
multiple entries in the dataset due to localisation (e.g. google.com and google.co.in) or been subdomains
of identical services (e.g. various blogs of blogspot.com). Finally, we removed all internationalised domain
names, since they are encoded using Punycode1 representation. After preprocessing the Alexa dataset,
we ended up with 915,994 unique domains.
Table 1: Distribution of records per DGA in our dataset. DGAs in green denote DGAs which were
initially underrepresented, so their source code was used to create more samples, while purple denotes
adversarial ones.
Class Support Class Support Class Support Class Support
bamital 86892 feodo 247 omexo 41 sisron 2580
banjori 439423 fobber 2000 padcrypt 246096 sphinx 174726
bedep 7814 fobber v1 298 pandabanker 32484 suppobox 98304
beebone 72 fobber v2 299 pitou 74314 sutra 3295
bigviktor 999 gameover 22723000 pizd 16384 symmi 65
blackhole 732 geodo 576 post 66000 szribi 20661
bobax/kraken/oderoor 30459 gozi 163529 proslikefan 218399 tempedreve 13323
ccleaner 12000 goznym 364 pushdo 380427 tinba 72719
chinad 750312 gspy 100 pushdotid 6000 tinynuke 52832
chir 100 hesperbot 16512 pykspa 1996763 tofsee 2100
conficker 2082010 infy 5220 pykspa v1 44688 torpig 18716
corebot 20931 khaos 10000 pykspa v2 fake 798 tsifiri 59
cryptolocker 368196 kingminer 252 pykspa v2 real 198 ud2 491
cryptowall 56624 locky 994381 pykspa2 1248 ud3 20
darkshell 49 madmax 4850 pykspa2s 9960 ud4 70
deception 149854 makloader 256 qadars 630127 vawtrak 17807
deception2 149908 matsnu 40050 qakbot 4579999 vidro 62567
diamondfox 279 mirai 2716 qhost 23 vidrotid 101
dircrypt 11210 modpack 107 qsnatch 1246482 virut 23669176
dmsniff 70 monerodownloader 2995 ramdo 6000 volatilecedar 498
dnschanger 1499578 monerominer 364271 ramnit 150662 wd 32172
dromedan 10000 murofet 13824213 ranbyus 578080 xshellghost 12001
dyre 2046998 murofetweekly 600000 redyms 91 xxhex 1900
ebury 2000 mydoom 2599 rovnix 207996 zloader 29992
ekforward 3649 necurs 12751075 shifu 2554
emotet 431048 nymaim 700102 shiotob/urlzone/bebloh 37031 Total 95,325,598
enviserv 500 nymaim2 110511 simda 24345
In the case of AGDs, the use of a single dataset, unfortunately very frequent in the literature, leads
to several issues and biases that can easily drive towards wrong analysis and misleading conclusions.
For instance, the public feed of DGAs provided by the Network Security Research Lab at 3602 as well
as the DGArchive [38] provide real-world datasets with millions of samples from many DGA families.
Nonetheless, despite the numerous samples in both these datasets, many malware families are significantly
underrepresented. A demonstrative example is the xshellghost family in the 360 dataset, which contains
only a single sample at the time of writing. Thankfully, the researchers at 360 have reversed the code of
this DGA3.
Since the provision of many samples is required to perform a decent evaluation of any detection
technique, we utilised the available code of DGAs that contained only a few samples, to populate our
dataset further. Our dataset was initialised with several public DGA repositories, e.g., J. Bader’s [10], A.
Abakumov’s [1], and P. Chaignon’s [16]. As explained above, we additionally used DGA code available at
these repositories to generate enough samples for underrepresented DGA families; we used a few random
seeds and/or the extended date range to obtain new samples.
Since we used the original code of the DGAs, the appended domains have identical characteristics to
the original ones and might occur in the real-world as well. Thus, these AGDs could have been collected in
the real world. Moreover, we added the SLDs of three adversarial DGAs, namely deception, deception2
[44] and khaos [55].
In summary, our dataset consists of 95,325,598 AGDs belonging to a total of 109 families, from which
105 are unique.4 The families included, along with their corresponding number of collected samples, are
reported in Table 1. The dataset is available for download at https://zenodo.org/record/3965397
[15].
1https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc3492
2https://data.netlab.360.com/dga/
3https://github.com/360netlab/DGA/blob/master/code/xshellghost/dga.py
4A few DGAs are used by multiple families.
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4 Proposed Features
We thoroughly analysed the AGDs in our dataset as well as the ideas behind existing AGD detection
approaches in the literature. We found out that the basic strategy for detecting non-wordlist-based
DGAs is to take advantage of the fact that they, in general, make little effort to be human-memorable,
as they are randomly generated. Moreover, even if they show a high correlation with readable words in
terms of vowel/consonant usage, etc., the generated domains are expected to contain from zero to only
a few words having a short length.
A general description of our approach is as follows: On receiving a domain name for analysis, we first
cache it to see correlations with previous ones. Then, we try to determine whether the SLD matches
some specific patterns, e.g. whether it is a hex value, the combination of vowels/consonants. Later, after
removing all digits, we try to break the remaining characters into words. Within these words, we prune
the short ones (e.g. stop words, articles) and study the remaining to determine whether they are real or
just gibberish. Moreover, we compute the entropy of the domain and a subset of the patterns created
during the correlation process. All the above provide us with several features that can be efficiently used
to determine whether a domain name is benign or not, without the need for external information (e.g.
WHOIS) or waiting for the domain name resolution revealing whether it is an NXDomain. In this way,
we may prune a significant amount of requests, regardless of their outcome.
The features used in our method are defined in Table 2. The first set of parameters is computed
when trying to identify valid n-grams and words. For the former, we train our n-gram model with Alexa
n-grams with lengths three, four and five. For the latter, we use the wordninja5 word splitter, which
probabilistically splits its input using NLP based on the unigram frequencies of the English Wikipedia.
Hence, we split the domain into meaningful words, according to a minimum word-length w. Therefore,
only terms which contain at least w characters are considered as significant. Then, we compute what
percentage of the domain characters are meaningful, by calculating the ratio γ between characters be-
longing to words and the domain’s total length. Next, we compute two more sets of features according
to statistical attributes as well as ratios using the previously calculated features.
In addition, we use a Gibberish detection layer, which consists of two methods. The first one is a
2-character Markov chain Gibberish detector6, which is trained with English text to determine how often
characters appear next to each other. Therefore, a text string is valid if it obtains a value above the
probability threshold for each pair of characters. The second is a Gibberish classifier.7 In this case, the
method checks mainly three features of the text: (i) whether the amount of unique chars is within a
typical range, (ii) whether the amount of vowels is within a standard range and (iii), whether the word
to char ratio is in a healthy range. Finally, we compute the entropy of a subset of the alphanumeric
sequences to enrich the feature set. Due to space constraints, we have included the average weight for
each classification task, which we further detail in Section 5.
5 Experimental Setup
In this section, we detail our setup and classification experiments. We also report the previous results
of our peers when a comparison with our current work is reasonable, to facilitate the assessment of our
method and serve as a basis for later discussion.
5.1 Classification
We assess the power of our proposed features (see Section 4) to differentiate between malicious and benign
domains (binary classification), as well as between several families of DGAs (multiclass classification).
We employ a Random Forest model, which is a non-parametric ensemble classifier. Random Forest
achieved outstanding performance results before on DGA classification tasks [2, 5].
The hyperparameters of the Random Forest algorithm were tuned with grid search, to maximise
classification performance in the task of distinguishing between benign and malicious domains in a
subset of our dataset. We found that best performance is achieved using an ensemble of 100 decision
trees with unlimited depth and bootstrap aggregation (bagging), where each new tree is fitted from a
bootstrap sample of the training data [14].
5https://github.com/keredson/wordninja
6https://github.com/rrenaud/Gibberish-Detector
7https://github.com/ProgramFOX/GibberishClassifier-Python
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Table 2: Features used in our approach. The average weight denotes the relevance (in percentage) of
certain features to a corresponding classification scenario.
Feature Set Notation Description
Avg. Weight
(Binary)
Avg. Weight
(Multiclass)
Alphanumeric Sequences
Dom Domain without TLD
Dom−D Dom without the digits
Dom−3G Set of 3-grams of Dom
Dom−4G Set of 4-grams of Dom
Dom−5G Set of 5-grams of Dom
Dom−W Domain concatenated words
Dom−WS Domain concatenated words with
spaces
Dom−WD Dom−D concatenated words
Dom−WDS Dom−D concatenated words with
spaces
Dom−W2 Domain concatenated words of length
> 2
Dom−W3 Domain concatenated words of length
> 3
Statistical Attributes
L−HEX The domain name is represented with
hexadecimal characters
1.38 0
L−LEN The length of Dom 5.32 19.76
L−DIG The number of digits in Dom 3.93 11.84
L−DOT The number of dots in the raw domain N/A 2.81
L−CON−MAX The maximum number of consecutive
consonants Dom
1.36 0.69
L−V OW−MAX The maximum number of consecutive
vowels Dom
0.32 0.18
L−W2 Number of words with more than 2
characters in Dom
0.45 1.01
L−W3 Number of words with more than 3
characters in Dom
1.59 0.07
Ratios
R−CON−V OW Ratio of consonants and vowels of
Dom
1.47 0.61
R−Dom−3G Ratio of benign grams in Dom−3G 1.57 1.53
R−Dom−4G Ratio of benign grams in Dom−4G 15.23 2.18
R−Dom−5G Ratio of benign grams in Dom−5G 11.70 0.43
R−V OW−3G Ratio of grams that contain a vowel
in Dom−3G
0.75 0.36
R−V OW−4G Ratio of grams that contain a vowel
in Dom−4G
0.65 0.33
R−V OW−5G Ratio of grams that contain a vowel
in Dom−5G
0.62 0.26
R−WS−LEN Dom−WS divided by L−LEN 7.95 2.42
R−WD−LEN Dom−WD divided by L−LEN 2.61 9.35
R−WDS−LEN Dom−WDS divided by L−LEN 6.20 7.40
R−W2−LEN Dom−W2 divided by L−LEN 1.95 0.84
R−W2−LEN−D Dom−W2 divided by Dom−D 1.28 0.33
R−W3−LEN Dom−W3 divided by L−LEN 2.61 0.16
R−W3−LEN−D Dom−W3 divided by Dom−D 2.54 0.16
Gibberish Probabilities
GIB−1−Dom Gibberish detector 1 applied to Dom 5.12 0.48
GIB−1−Dom−WS Gibberish detector 1 applied to
Dom−WS
1.67 0.52
GIB−1−Dom−D Gibberish detector 1 applied to
Dom−D
5.76 0.48
GIB−1−Dom−WDS Gibberish detector 1 applied to
Dom−WDS
0.82 0.48
GIB−1−Dom−W2 Gibberish detector 1 applied to
Dom−W2
0.46 0.46
GIB−1−Dom−W3 Gibberish detector 1 applied to
Dom−W3
0.97 0.07
GIB−2−Dom Gibberish detector 2 applied to Dom 0.92 0.75
GIB−2−Dom−WS Gibberish detector 2 applied to
Dom−WS
0.87 0.80
GIB−2−Dom−D Gibberish detector 2 applied to
Dom−D
1.09 0.69
GIB−2−Dom−WDS Gibberish detector 2 applied to
Dom−WDS
0.89 1.26
GIB−2−Dom−W2 Gibberish detector 2 applied to
Dom−W2
0.19 0.24
GIB−2−Dom−W3 Gibberish detector 2 applied to
Dom−W3
1.00 0.11
Entropy
E−Dom Entropy of Dom 2.10 12.66
E−Dom−WS Entropy of Dom−WS 1.44 8.19
E−Dom−D Entropy of Dom−D 2.27 4.76
E−Dom−WDS Entropy of Dom−WDS 1.51 3.39
E−Dom−W2 Entropy of Dom−W2 0.63 1.62
E−Dom−W3 Entropy of Dom−W3 0.81 0.16
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All our experiments were performed on a system equipped with an NVIDIA TITAN Xp PG611-c00 to
boost the performance, while we utilised the implementations of the scikit-learn8 library. We evaluate
the performance of the trained classifiers using the standard classifications metrics of Precision, Recall,
F1 score and the area under the curve (AUC).
In all experiments, we employed standard 10-fold cross-validation to get a roughly unbiased estimate
of the accuracy of predictive models we trained.
Binary Classification. We employed random sampling without replacement for AGDs domains from
the corresponding classes to fit a specific ratio with the benign domains, and we repeated each experiment
100 times (with different sample subsets) to ensure the statistical significance of the results. In the current
experiment, we trained a binary Random Forest classifier for each DGA family in our dataset, such that
the ratio of AGDs and benign domains was 1:1. Nevertheless, we will use different ratios to reproduce our
binary experiment, which will be later described in Section 6)Note that due to the particular format in
which several families are available in their reverse-engineered form, as well as in the AGD repositories
used to initialise our dataset, we could not use the L − DOT feature homogeneously, and thus, we
excluded it from this experiment.
The averaged outcomes of the binary classification can be seen in Table 3. We can observe that most
of the DGA families are classified almost without errors, obtaining precision and recall metrics of or
above 99.9%. Even in the case of families with small representation (e.g. darkshell, omexo, qhost, and
ud3), the classifier can discern between benign and malicious domains in almost 100% of cases, with only
a few exceptions. Moreover, the standard deviation of the F1 (i.e., σF1) achieves values ∼1%, being in
most cases ≤0.01%, showcasing the robustness of both the classifier and the proposed feature set.
The lowest accuracy was obtained by bigviktor (with a precision of 91.07% and a recall of 76.44%)
followed by suppobox, gozi, matsnu, khaos and symmi with F1 scores ranging between 95% and 98%.
This is due to the fact that most of these families use a composition of English dictionary words to create
AGDs, so the extracted lexical features are not always able to properly differentiate them from our benign
dataset or are adversarial. In the case of such dictionary-based families, a further enhancement based
on probabilistic-based methodologies9 is an interesting but challenging future research direction. In the
case of adversarial DGAs, the accuracy obtained is close to the reported for the dictionary-based DGAs,
which showcases the difficulty of capturing such families. A more detailed comparison and analysis of
adversarial DGAs is later presented in Section 5.2. Overall, the relatively surprising fact that we obtained
the outstanding detection rates showed in Table 3 by using the same feature set across such a big dataset
proves the robustness and adaptability of our approach. Note that the more divergent families (and
samples) are, the more difficult is to select a common set of features which can capture them accurately.
We depict the average weight of each feature in the classification task in Table 2. Since the al-
phanumeric sequences are used as the input to compute the rest of the features, they do not have any
weights. The features exhibiting more impact in the binary classification, on average, are R−Dom−4G,
R−Dom−5G, R−WS−LEN , R−WDS−LEN , GIB−1−Dom−D, and L−LEN . Therefore, the n-
grams, as well as the length of the domain and the valid words it contains, seem to be the most relevant
features. Besides that, the relevance of each feature varies according to the family. A complete report
on the per family weight of each feature can be found in [15]. Feature weights provide some insights
into how to try to further enhance the performance of our method, e.g., by employing various feature
selection methods to reduce the number of features, which might be convenient in power-constrained
devices such as IoT device or smartphones.
Multiclass Classification. In this experiment, we further explore the potential of our proposed set
of features to go beyond a binary classification and try to predict the DGA families, given a set of
AGDs, in a multiclass classification setting. In this regard, a fair cross-comparison of the multiclass
performance cannot be made if different approaches use different datasets. Therefore, we used another
dataset introduced in [10]. This dataset was used by Alaeiyan et al. [2] in their experiments, and we
extended their comparison with the other two methods reported in the literature, namely DeepDGA [5]
and Phoenix [39]. We performed a multiclass classification using our Random Forest classifier, this time
slightly changing its configuration from the one used for the binary classification (i.e. an ensemble of
200 trees with unlimited depth). The repository of this dataset had no longer contained samples of the
RunForestrun family, so we did not include it in the comparison. Moreover, we observed that Tinba
family had repeated SLD entries, which would lead to a biased and possibly unrepresentative classification
(i.e. the same samples could easily end up both in the training and testing set, thus reporting a 100%
8https://scikit-learn.org
9Note that these methodologies have demonstrated remarkable detection performance [34].
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Table 3: Averaged performance measures for a binary classification (in percentage) averaged over 100
experiments.
Class Prec. Recall F1 σF1 AUC Class Prec. Recall F1 σF1 AUC Class Prec. Recall F1 σF1 AUC
bamital 100 100 100 0 100 gspy 99.67 100 99.83 0.29 100 qakbot 100 99.97 99.98 0.01 99.99
banjori 99.99 99.74 99.87 0.01 99.87 hesperbot 100 99.85 99.92 0.01 99.93 qhost 100 100 100 0 100
bedep 100 100 100 0 100 infy 100 99.97 99.98 0.01 99.98 qsnatch 99.77 99.86 99.81 0.02 99.81
beebone 100 99.07 99.53 0.40 99.54 khaos 99.47 96.47 97.95 0.10 97.98 ramdo 100 100 100 0 100
bigviktor 91.07 76.44 83.11 0.32 87.85 kingminer 100 97.62 98.8 <0.01 98.81 ramnit 100 99.95 99.97 0.02 99.98
blackhole 100 99.86 99.93 <0.01 99.93 locky 100 99.79 99.9 0.04 99.9 ranbyus 100 99.99 100 0 100
bobax/kraken/oderoor 100 99.62 99.81 0.01 99.81 madmax 100 99.98 99.99 <0.01 99.99 redyms 100 99.63 99.82 0.32 99.82
ccleaner 100 100 100 0 100 makloader 100 100 100 0 100 rovnix 100 100 100 0 100
chinad 100 100 100 0 100 matsnu 95.73 97.74 96.72 0.2 96.69 shifu 100 99.63 99.82 0.01 99.82
chir 99.67 100 99.83 0.29 100 mirai 100 99.96 99.98 <0.01 99.98 shiotob/urlzone/bebloh 100 99.99 99.99 <0.01 99.99
conficker 99.99 99.64 99.81 0.02 99.82 modpack 100 100 100 0 100 simda 99.99 99.66 99.83 0.01 99.83
corebot 100 99.98 99.99 <0.01 99.99 monerodownloader 100 100 100 0 100 sisron 100 100 100 0 100
cryptolocker 100 99.98 99.99 <0.01 99.99 monerominer 100 100 100 0 100 sphinx 100 100 100 0 100
cryptowall 100 99.87 99.93 0.02 99.94 murofet 100 99.99 100 <0.01 100 suppobox 96.84 98.3 97.57 0.02 97.55
darkshell 100 97.5 98.73 0 98.75 murofetweekly 100 100 100 0 100 sutra 100 99.97 99.98 <0.01 99.98
deception 99.03 97.00 98.00 0.07 98.02 mydoom 100 99.6 99.8 0.01 99.8 symmi 100 93.85 96.83 <0.01 96.92
deception2 98.25 96.15 97.19 0.1 97.22 necurs 100 99.89 99.95 0.02 99.95 szribi 99.98 99.68 99.83 0.03 99.83
diamondfox 100 97.13 98.55 <0.01 98.57 nymaim 100 99.6 99.8 0.03 99.8 tempedreve 100 99.56 99.78 0.02 99.78
dircrypt 100 99.94 99.97 <0.01 99.97 nymaim2 98.35 97.99 98.17 0.07 98.17 tinba 100 99.92 99.96 0.02 99.96
dmsniff 100 95.71 97.81 <0.01 97.86 omexo 100 100 100 0 100 tinynuke 100 100 100 0 100
dnschanger 100 99.93 99.96 0.02 99.97 padcrypt 100 100 100 0 100 tofsee 99.94 99.92 99.93 0.02 99.95
dromedan 100 100 100 0 100 pandabanker 100 100 100 0 100 torpig 100 99.79 99.89 0.01 99.9
dyre 100 100 100 0 100 pitou 100 99.89 99.94 0.02 99.95 tsifiri 100 100 100 0 100
ebury 100 100 100 0 100 pizd 99.43 99.62 99.52 0.09 99.52 ud2 100 100 100 0 100
ekforward 100 99.99 100 <0.01 100 post 100 100 100 0 100 ud3 100 100 100 0 100
emotet 100 100 100 0 100 proslikefan 100 99.63 99.81 0.04 99.82 ud4 100 96.19 98.06 0.43 98.1
enviserv 100 100 100 0 100 pushdo 99.94 98.99 99.46 0.02 99.46 vawtrak 99.92 99.44 99.68 0.01 99.68
feodo 100 100 100 0 100 pushdotid 100 99.62 99.81 0 99.81 vidro 100 99.78 99.89 0.03 99.89
fobber 100 99.85 99.92 0 99.93 pykspa 100 99.7 99.85 0.01 99.85 vidrotid 100 96.04 97.98 <0.01 98.02
fobber v1 100 100 100 0 100 pykspa v1 100 99.28 99.64 0 99.64 virut 99.97 99.99 99.98 <0.01 99.98
fobber v2 100 99.78 99.89 0.1 99.89 pykspa v2 fake 100 99.77 99.89 0.01 99.89 volatilecedar 99.93 100 99.97 0.06 100
gameover 100 100 100 0 100 pykspa v2 real 100 99.77 99.88 0.01 99.88 wd 100 100 100 0 100
geodo 100 100 100 0 100 pykspa2 100 99.12 99.56 0.06 99.56 xshellghost 100 99.93 99.97 0.01 99.97
gozi 95.28 95.93 95.6 0.11 95.59 pykspa2s 100 97.47 98.72 <0.01 98.74 xxhex 100 99.96 99.98 0.02 99.98
goznym 100 99.27 99.63 0.16 99.63 qadars 100 99.98 99.99 0.01 99.99 zloader 100 100 100 0 100
detection in most of the validations partly due to this fact). Therefore, we used a subset of the Tinba
samples that are presented in our dataset. The outcomes of the multiclass classification are depicted
in Table 4. Even though in some cases Phoenix and DeepDGA showed better performance (e.g. for
Padcrypt, Qadars, and Symmi), our method outperformed the rest, both in accuracy and recall, followed
by the method proposed in [2]. Furthermore, we observed that there were relatively small differences for
most families, and for the most part all methods reported high accuracy for similar families. In some
cases, the reported metrics were equal to zero, which is related to the lack of samples, and it translates
into data for the classifier to be properly trained.
We can observe in Table 2 that feature relevance in the multiclass setting differs substantially from
the reported in the binary classification. In other words, the relevance of the features will be different
according to the the particularities of the collected samples, highlighting the importance of using the
same dataset to avoid biased comparisons across different approaches. In the particular case of the
dataset selected to perform the multiclass classification, the features L−LEN , E−Dom, L−DIG, R−
WD−LEN , and R−WDS−LEN were the most relevant. The latter means that the length (e.g. specific
families only create AGDs of fixed length), the number of digits, the meaningful words in the SLD, and
the entropy of the SLD enabled to predict which specific family created a given AGD, with high precision.
5.2 Adversarial DGA Classification
To further assess the quality of our selected features, we opted to use it against three specially “hard to
detect” DGAs. These DGAs, decept, decept2 [44], and Khaos [55] are specially crafted, using machine
learning methods, to evade detection (see Section 2). As illustrated in Table 5, while our features are
generic and not targeted towards identifying any particular set of these families, we also manage to
efficiently detect them, significantly better than in previous works reported by their authors.
In fact, our precision rate is between 15% and 30% better. Similarly, the recall and F1 score are more
than 10% better in almost all cases. It may also be observed that in some occasions, the detection rates
slightly vary if the ratio of malicious to benign samples is increased. This fact will be discussed more
thoroughly in Section 6. Nonetheless, the F1 score is at least 92.48%, which indicates that our method
is very effective even when confronted against specially crafted DGAs, a challenge that should be very
close to representing the worst case scenario.
It should be noted that, during our study, we identified many invalid domains generated by these
DGAs. To the best of our understanding, the researchers simply left the neural networks to generate
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Table 4: Multiclass classification outcomes in percentages, using different metrics. The averages are
weighted according to the number of samples in each family.
Phoenix [39] DeepDGA [5] Alaeiyan et al. [2] Our Method
Class Precision Recall F1 Precision Recall F1 Precision Recall F1 Precision Recall F1
banjori 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 99.80 100 99.90
chinad 74.2 84.1 78.84 98.8 96.3 97.53 92.3 19.5 32.20 87.99 97.27 92.39
corebot 88.4 97.4 92.68 100 100 100 100 97.4 98.68 100 72.50 84.06
dircrypt 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
downloader 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100
dnschanger 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
fobber 3.2 2 2.46 3.1 7.6 4.40 0 0 0 37.62 12.67 18.95
gozi 7.1 50.0 12.43 3.0 3.0 3.00 0 0 0 0 0 0
javascript 2.0 3.4 2.52 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
locky 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
murofet 99.9 98.0 98.94 100 98.0 98.99 99.7 99.4 99.55 99.91 99.79 99.85
necurs 22.2 15.8 18.46 28.0 32.7 30.17 30.2 5.1 8.73 32.24 8.15 13.02
newgoz 97.2 94.1 95.62 100 99.6 99.80 98 89.9 93.78 99.40 100 99.70
kraken 88.1 52.3 65.64 90.7 60.3 72.44 98.5 90 94.06 99.30 99.93 99.61
padcrypt 79.3 100 88.46 88.5 100 93.90 100 65.2 78.93 87.50 29.17 43.75
proslikefan 3.0 19.4 5.20 4.0 23.5 6.84 0 0 0.00 25.00 2.00 3.70
pykspa 85.2 61.4 71.37 89.1 80.3 84.47 84.7 99.4 91.46 83.50 86.86 85.15
qadars 60.4 81.1 69.24 85.2 84.7 84.95 96.9 16.3 27.91 69.70 34.50 46.15
qakbot 53.5 55.0 54.24 57.9 56.6 57.24 54.5 82.1 65.51 65.69 76.70 70.77
ramnit 1.2 3.3 1.76 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
ranbyus 2.1 6.5 3.17 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
shiotob 96.7 81.6 88.51 98.3 89.8 93.86 84.7 91.4 87.92 92.26 90.00 91.12
simda 63.0 99.0 77.00 98.3 89.8 93.86 89.6 100 94.51 91.33 99.00 95.01
sisron 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100
suppobox 32.4 79.3 46.00 67.4 74.6 70.82 97.3 68.5 80.40 90.61 98.43 94.36
symmi 98.3 96.6 97.44 98.3 100 99.14 98.3 100 99.14 92.31 56.25 69.90
tempedreve 27.6 67.1 39.11 43.8 96.3 60.21 57.2 75.1 64.94 59.98 71.94 65.42
tinba 25.3 64.6 36.36 49.9 98.2 66.17 100 99.7 99.85 99.52 99.94 99.73
vawtrak 30.9 9.7 14.77 68.3 87.5 76.72 100 8.3 15.33 69.47 66.00 67.69
Weighted Average 93.25 90.46 91.40 94.64 92.49 93.28 94.49 95.20 94.41 95.39 95.49 95.25
AGDs that bypassed the filters, without double-checking their validity in real scenarios. As a result, the
neural networks identified that the use of the hyphen character managed to bypass some filters, priming
them to overuse it. Therefore, one can observe thousands of domains which either start or finish with
a hyphen, which are unfortunately invalid according to RFC 1123 [13]. Similarly, many of them do not
conform to RFC 5891 for Internationalized Domain Names [24], by having hyphens as third and fourth
characters, but not starting with an “xn”, so they are rejected by ICANN10. The issue is particularly
relevant in the DGAs generated by Spooren et al. [44] spanning across 1.64% of the samples. In the
Khaos DGA, the dataset contains only 19 IDNs; consequently, in all following work, we consider DGAs
which do not produce IDNs.
It is very straightforward that simple rules could have resolved these issues; nonetheless, it is a typical
error that one expects to observe when machines are left unattended to do their “work”. Notably, this
issue was not relevant for any of the real-world DGA families.
5.3 Performance and Time Overhead
We measured several statistics during our experiments, with the intention to demonstrate the perfor-
mance of our approach. We measured the duration of the features computation and the prediction time
in both the binary and multiclass setting with our dataset. The average time required to compute all
the features for an SLD is 1.48 ms, while the prediction times from both classification experiments are
depicted in Figure 3. Note that the table does not include the training time, which scales linearly with
the size of the dataset However, training is an action that can be very rare (e.g., repeated after weeks
or months) and thus is not too taxing to the overall performance. Moreover, it can be performed offline,
so it does not add any additional cost. Finally, both the features computation and the prediction times
are measured without any parallelisation, to allow for a fair comparison with related work.
Considering related works that have studied the multiclass classification (see Table 4), a fine-grained
comparison of processing performance was not possible since the achieved performance was not systemat-
ically reported and in some cases not stated at all. Moreover, such performance highly varies depending
on the exact hardware configuration, and thus, the exact replication of each of the environments used
is challenging. For instance, the authors of [39] report only that experiments required time in the order
10https://www.icann.org/en/system/files/files/idn-guidelines-10may18-en.pdf
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Table 5: Binary classification against adversarial DGAs. First row of each family denotes the reported
results in the original work.
DGA Ratio Precision Recall F1
Khaos
N/A 68.00 98.00 80.30
1:1 99.47 96.47 97.95
1:10 96.08 90.73 93.32
1:100 96.55 89.63 92.96
N/A 84.40 87.10 85.72
1:1 99.03 97.00 98.00
1:10 96.21 93.86 95.02
deception
1:100 96.12 93.29 94.68
deception2
N/A 77.50 81.50 79.45
1:1 98.25 96.15 97.19
1:10 94.44 91.29 92.84
1:100 94.56 90.50 92.48
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Figure 3: Prediction time per SLD, in milliseconds.
of minutes. In the case of [5], authors stated that their model required expensive training periods of
14 hours (considering 300 epochs and Alexa subsampling), as well as a classification time of 7 minutes
for approximately 13k samples (i.e. 0.03 seconds per sample) in a GPU-based setup. In work presented
in [2], the authors reported a feature computation time of around 217 minutes for 252,757 samples, which
implies approximately 0.05 seconds per sample. Moreover, the authors also specified a classification time
of around 60 minutes, which translates into 0.014 seconds on average to classify a sample.
In sum, our approach outperformed related work in time requirements by one order of magnitude for
both the feature computation as well as in the prediction. This means that our method is suitable for
real-time AGD detection and classification, even in environments with very high traffic volumes.
6 Discussion
In this section, we focus on a comparison of the most relevant DGA detectors of the related work, and
we analyze the existing limitations in the literature.
Quantitative Comparison. The DGA research field has several open challenges; one of them is the
continuous appearance of new families. In contrast to other research fields that rely on standardised
benchmarks (e.g., computer vision), DGA-based datasets need to be updated frequently to be able to
prove the performance of the detection methods is of relevance in real scenarios. Recently, Zago et al. [57]
created a balanced and structured dataset containing 38 families. Nevertheless, although their approach
is sound, it does not keep pace with the recent evolution of malware campaigns. Solving this issue is
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Table 6: Quantitative comparison between our method and the most relevant state-of-the-art techniques.
Reference Features # DGAs Method Dataset Source
[5] Lexical, entropy 10 GAN, LSTM, RF Not reported
[39] Lexical 5 DBSCAN SIE framework, Expo-
sure blacklist and other
public implementations
[19] WHOIS, lexical, smashword score 41 RNN DGArchive and Several
GitHub repositories
[25] Lexical 4 ELMo Several GitHub reposito-
ries
[53] Time-based, query response, do-
main name
19 LSTM / CNN Farsight security /
DGArchive
[46] Domain name 37 LSTM Bambenek
[27] Domain name 58 RNN DGArchive, Bambenek
[54] Lexical Not reported CCN/RNN Bambenek
[31] Entropy, lexical 37 Several ML methods Bambenek
[18] Lexical 19 Random Forest and DNN Bambenek, DGArchive
[26] Lexical, query response 5 Several ML methods Bambenek
[22] Lexical 19 DNN Bambenek, Netlab 360
[17] Domain name 60 LSTM Bambenek, Netlab 360
[42] Time-based and domain name 15 Several Binary Classificators Real traffic, Bambenek
[8] Domain name 19 LSTM, BLSTM Bambenek and Netlab
360
[56] Entropy, lexical, similarity 17 Several ML methods Netlab 360, DGArchive,
DNS-BH
[12] Domain name 19 LSTM, BLSTM Bambenek, Netlab 360
[23] Entropy, lexical 5 CNN/RNN Stratosphere dataset [45]
[57] Lexical 38 Several ML methods UMUDGA
[4] Lexical 19 Several ML methods Netlab 360
[51] Domain name 20 BLSTM, HDNN Fu et al. [20]
[2] Lexical, pronounceability 30 Genetic algorithm and RF Bader [10]
[3] Entropy, randomness, lexical 20 Several ML methods DGArchive, Bambenek
Our approach Entropy, lexical, gibberish 105 RF HYDRA Dataset [15]
hard, and although there are research efforts in adversarial classification (see Section 2), we argue that
further research should focus on upgradeable versions of datasets and include version tracking. In our
dataset, we introduce a collection of 105 families, which better reflects the complexity and challenge of the
current landscape. Moreover, it is worth to note that obtaining enough samples of specific families can
be a cumbersome and difficult task due to a number of reasons, such as the inner algorithmic structure
of the DGA11 or the fact that it has not been reverse engineered yet. Therefore, we argue that obtaining
a perfectly balanced dataset that contains all possible DGA families is extremely difficult, borderline
impossible. In this regard, we stress that due to the heterogeneity and non-replicability of some datasets
as well as the range of different techniques applied in related work, a perfect and fair comparison is
unfeasible. As it can be observed in Table 6, the results of our work were achieved using the biggest
dataset in terms of the number of DGA families (and samples). This compares favourably and leads
to a much more challenging classification task when compared to related work. Due to the continuous
evolution of malware, a high number of supported DGA families (including the most recent ones) is
a critical capability required of any successful DGA detector that can be deployed in real scenarios.
Note that data sources of related works in the table share some common repositories such as Bambenek,
DGArchive, and NetLab 360. However, only a few authors used reverse-engineered DGAs to populate
their datasets, as seen in Table 6 and described in Section 3. With regard to the detection method used,
LSTM is the most prevalent, followed by ML classifiers, from which RF is known to report the best
classification performance. Regarding the features, both lexical (e.g., ratios of letters, n-grams, words)
and entropy-based ones seem to occur most widely.
The methods that use side-information (e.g., WHOIS, timing, etc.) cannot prevent compromised hosts
from contacting the C&C server, and thus bring an additional cost in terms of time which makes them
prohibitively slow for real-time detection and incident response. Undeniably, caching and whitelisting
can significantly reduce such a cost; however, this is expected to occur every time the host has to connect
with a new domain or a DGA has a new seed, which is unrealistic in most scenarios.
Fair Comparison and Evaluation Reproducibility. As previously reported in Section 5.1, the
comparison of any two approaches should be made under the same contextual settings (i.e., benchmarks
and performance metrics); otherwise, the interpretation of the results might be biased and unduly favour
an approach with less challenging settings. To analyse the quality and the methodologies used in related
research, we reviewed the works from Table 6 in terms of reproducibility and presentation of the outcomes.
In detail, we verified whether the authors explicitly reported their evaluation methodology, their dataset
11E.g., it can create only a small set of samples due to the use of specific dictionaries.
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Table 7: Methodological limitations of related works.
Methodological Limitations References
Not reported samples, extremely im-
balanced benchmarks or lack of ro-
bust performance measures
[53, 19, 46, 27, 54, 31, 17, 4] [17, 56, 23, 2]
Aggregated classification outcomes [46, 27, 54, 18, 22, 17, 17, 42, 4][8, 56, 12, 23, 57, 2, 3, 51]
collection procedure (for reproducibility purposes), and sufficient details about their outcomes (for a fair
comparison). The results of this effort are showed in Table 7, where we observe that there are some serious
methodological issues mainly due to the lack of experimental setup description, biased performance
measures being used and/or extremely imbalanced datasets, and the aggregation of classification results
by averaging, while not reporting information about some poorly performing families.
Moreover, when the reported results are aggregated (i.e. the outcomes are not reported per class
but as an overall aggregate), the unbalanced nature of the dataset, as well as the fact of hiding the
classification performance per family hinders the objective interpretation of the results (e.g. a very
small sample set could not reflect the characteristics of a family, and specific sampling ratios of benign to
malicious domains might result in statistically biased outcomes). This, in turn, translates into approaches
that might obtain highly accurate results for some families, while they are unable to detect other families;
however, the occurrence of this phenomenon cannot be discerned from the reported results, and thus a
fair comparison cannot be made.
The same benchmark settings in the case of multiclass classification is even more critical to allow for
a fair comparison, since the more families used the more difficult is to classify them, especially taking
into account their random nature. Moreover, since several DGAs can create the same pattern, the more
samples collected the more possibilities of overlapping the domain names [2, 57, 34, 31], which increases
chances for misclassification thus making the problem more challenging. Nevertheless, in the case of
binary classification with a statistically sound methodology, highly accurate detection of underrepresented
families indicates the robustness of the selected features, thus showcasing the high performance of the
detection method even in extreme cases.
Sound Evaluation Methodology. We argue that an objective comparison of the results among dif-
ferent approaches is possible only through a sound evaluation methodology. To do so, it is imperative
to include the reporting of the performance over data with the same ratio of AGD samples to benign
domains. Moreover, such experiments should be repeated several times with different sample sets (e.g.,
100 times in our case and using 10-fold cross-validation in each iteration), since methodologies using a
single run of n-fold cross-validation only shuffles samples within the selected sample set. For instance,
one could perform a 1:1 ratio classification between Alexa and a malicious family with 50 samples. In
this setup, which is frequently adopted by ML practitioners in this field, only 50 samples of Alexa would
be selected and shuffled in the cross-validation. Therefore, the rest of the Alexa samples will not be used
unless the experiments are repeated with different samples to produce a statistically sound outcome. In
this regard, repeating the experiments and selecting a different set of samples in each iteration provides
a better representation of the characteristics of each family and hence a much more realistic accuracy.
In this setup, low values of the standard deviation in the results indicate the desirable stability and
robustness of the method. Unfortunately, this methodology is rarely adopted in the field.
Ratios of Malicious and Benign Samples. The well-known imbalance problem [29] argues that
there are much less malicious events than benign ones when performing, e.g. traffic analysis and intrusion
detection, if real scenarios are considered [40, 48, 30]. Nevertheless, in the area of DGA analysis there
is no wide consensus on the common ratio of benign to malicious domains that one can commonly find
in real-world scenarios. This is due to some DGAs generating only a few domains per day, while others
might create them in the hundreds or thousands. Therefore, we made a conscious effort to evaluate the
performance of our approach under malicious to benign ratios different than 1:1, and hence we explored
ratios of 1:10 and 1:100 as well. During our experiments, if a malicious family had more samples than
the size of the benign dataset, these are under-sampled, to obtain the desired ratios. Table 8 shows the
results obtained by using the F1 measure and its standard deviation across 100 repetitions of the 10-fold
cross-validation, selecting different samples in each iteration.
When we compare the outcomes obtained across all ratios (i.e. 1:1, 1:10, and 1:100), we can ob-
serve that dictionary-based and adversarial families obtain slightly worse accuracy when the malicious
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Table 8: Binary classification outcomes with different ratios of malicious to benign domains (we always
assume a higher number of benign domains in the ratios).
Ratio 1:10 Ratio 1:100 Ratio 1:10 Ratio 1:100 Ratio 1:10 Ratio 1:100
Class F1 σ F1 σ Class F1 σ F1 σ Class F1 σ F1 σ
bamital 99.98 0.03 99.97 0.03 gspy 100 0 100 0 qakbot 99.88 0.03 99.87 0.03
banjori 99.60 0.13 99.51 0.18 hesperbot 99.90 0.05 99.9 0.05 qhost 100 0 100 0
bedep 99.93 0.03 99.93 0.03 infy 99.92 0.03 99.93 0.08 qsnatch 99.07 0.36 98.82 0.14
beebone 99.53 0.40 99.53 0.40 khaos 93.33 0.69 92.96 0.83 ramdo 99.98 0.03 99.98 0.03
bigviktor 93.56 0.58 93.26 0.28 kingminer 98.80 <0.01 98.8 <0.01 ramnit 99.9 0.05 99.93 0.03
blackhole 100 0 99.98 0.04 locky 99.63 0.06 99.77 0.12 ranbyus 99.93 0.06 99.95 0.05
bobax/kraken/oderoor 99.82 0.03 99.68 0.12 madmax 99.90 0.05 99.93 0.06 redyms 100 0 100 0
ccleaner 100 0 99.98 0.03 makloader 99.94 0.11 100 0 rovnix 100 0 99.98 0.03
chinad 99.97 0.03 100 0 matsnu 91.86 0.67 91.58 0.46 shifu 99.68 0.10 99.70 0.05
chir 100 0 100 0 mirai 99.95 0.05 99.90 0.05 shiotob/urlzone/bebloh 99.95 0.05 99.98 0.03
conficker 99.45 0.05 99.23 0.13 modpack 100 0 100 0 simda 99.03 0.1 99.09 0.14
corebot 99.97 0.03 99.97 0.03 monerodownloader 100 0 100 0 sisron 100 0 100 0
cryptolocker 99.95 0.05 99.95 0.05 monerominer 100 0 100 0 sphinx 100 0 99.97 0.06
cryptowall 99.87 0.06 99.95 0.05 murofet 100 0 99.95 <0.01 suppobox 92.39 0.37 91.92 0.59
darkshell 100 0 99.58 0.73 murofetweekly 100 0 100 0 sutra 99.95 0.05 99.97 0.06
deception 95.02 0.29 94.69 0.44 mydoom 99.73 0.03 99.75 0.05 symmi 96.55 0.48 96.55 0.48
deception2 92.85 0.86 92.49 0.46 necurs 99.85 0.09 99.87 0.03 szribi 99.70 0.09 99.6 0.17
diamondfox 98.61 0.10 98.67 0.10 nymaim 99.46 0.12 99.38 0.10 tempedreve 99.62 0.06 99.7 0.10
dircrypt 99.85 <0.01 99.92 0.03 nymaim2 94.53 0.58 94.37 0.41 tinba 99.92 0.03 99.95 0.05
dmsniff 98.06 0.43 98.32 0.39 omexo 99.60 0.7 99.6 0.70 tinynuke 100 0 100 0
dnschanger 99.95 0.05 99.88 0.03 padcrypt 99.98 0.03 100 0 tofsee 99.9 0.05 99.8 0
dromedan 99.9 0.10 99.93 0.03 pandabanker 99.98 0.03 99.97 0.06 torpig 99.48 0.13 99.62 0.03
dyre 100 0 100 0 pitou 99.87 0.03 99.80 0.13 tsifiri 99.16 0.83 99.72 0.49
ebury 99.98 0.03 100 0 pizd 96.90 0.09 96.61 0.25 ud2 100 0 99.97 0.06
ekforward 99.92 0.03 99.93 0.03 post 100 0 100 0 ud3 100 0 100 0
emotet 99.98 0.03 99.98 0.03 proslikefan 99.75 0.09 99.51 0.15 ud4 98.30 0.43 98.30 0.43
enviserv 99.97 0.06 100 0 pushdo 98.46 0.06 98.28 0.16 vawtrak 98.77 0.19 98.54 0.36
feodo 99.93 0.12 99.93 0.12 pushdotid 99.72 0.08 99.73 0.06 vidro 99.83 0.08 99.88 0.03
fobber 99.93 0.03 99.88 0.03 pykspa 99.67 0.08 99.67 0.18 vidrotid 97.82 0.28 97.98 <0.01
fobber v1 100 0 100 0 pykspa v1 99.58 0.03 99.63 0.08 virut 99.80 0.09 99.88 0.03
fobber v2 100 0 100 0 pykspa v2 fake 99.65 0.05 99.51 0.08 volatilecedar 99.90 0.10 99.93 0.12
gameover 100 0 99.98 0.03 pykspa v2 real 99.55 0.09 99.58 0.03 wd 100 0 100 0
geodo 100 0 100 0 pykspa2 99.52 0.04 99.56 <0.01 xshellghost 99.93 0.03 99.85 0.05
gozi 93.04 0.19 92.68 0.52 pykspa2s 98.29 0.15 98.20 <0.01 xxhex 100 0 99.95 0.09
goznym 99.54 0.08 99.49 0.08 qadars 99.93 0.03 99.93 0.03 zloader 100 0 100 0
to benign ratio is increased. The latter occurs because these DGAs create domains that have structural
similarities with Alexa domains, which increases the difficulty of the classification task due to the over-
lapping features. Nevertheless, as it can be observed in the rest of cases, the variance of the outcomes
according to each sampling ratios is minimal, which denotes stable results. This means that our ap-
proach and its features represent homogeneously benign domains, and thus, they are able to accurately
distinguish them from malicious ones, regardless of the sample ratio. This showcases the quality of the
feature selection as well as the statistical confidence of the classification.
A proper methodology should also be considered when using automated approaches for machine
learning, such as H2O12, auto-sklearn 13, AutoKeras14 etc. Such libraries may hyper-optimise parameters
for many methods and generate a model which maximises, for instance, the F1 score. We argue that
this unique win should not be considered as the best method since, as discussed above, this solution has
to be weighed along with the efficiency of the rest of the models over the same family, and considering
several repetitions, only in this way providing statistical soundness.
7 Conclusions
Nowadays, modern malware has evolved into highly sophisticated software, which can be used to infect
millions of devices. This enables hard-to-detect and resilient malware campaigns, which have turned
cybercrime into a profitable “business”. To enable faster and more accurate botnet detection and to
speed-up take-down operations, we present a new DGA detection method using machine learning. In
essence, our method outperforms all the current state of the art approaches because we use better features
and a broader and complete dataset. The relevance of our features is manifested in three ways. First,
it achieves an almost optimal detection rate in the binary classification for the broadest possible set of
DGA families. Secondly, our features allow our method to outperform the current state of the art also in
12https://www.h2o.ai/
13https://github.com/automl/auto-sklearn
14https://github.com/keras-team/autokeras?spm=a2c65.11461447.0.0.68b37903yEmaw3
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multiclass classification, using the same limited dataset presented in other works. Finally, our approach,
without taking into consideration the features needed for adversarial DGAs, manages to detect them
very efficiently.
Additionally, our methodology is more rigorous than most seen in the field, avoiding common pitfalls
in the literature that focus on DGAs with many non-obvious constraints. Setting aside the feature
extraction, our work highlights the inherent biases of datasets and methodologies of previous literature
that report many close to perfect results; however, these results may be true for only a very limited and
unrepresentative number of DGA families. Notably, we stress the methodological errors in the use of
machine learning with, e.g. the use of very few samples and in parallel multi-fold validation. In this
regard, we constructed and shared a dataset with more than 95m AGDs, providing the extracted features
to the community. While this facilitates the reproducibility of our results, we also enable researchers
to use a significantly richer baseline dataset, both in terms of families and the number of samples.
Furthermore, practitioners may use it to improve the efficacy of their defence mechanisms and for a
fairer and more realistic assessment of their proposals.
In future work, we aim to enhance our semantic classification by using other training sources to
increase the accuracy for both English and non-English domain names. Moreover, we will explore
wordlist-based DGA detection in more depth by using probabilistic approaches based on word repetition
and other features.
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